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By Professors Jaap-Henk Hoepman and Bart Jacobs, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands
Professors Jaap-Henk Hoepman and Bart Jacobs, Computer Security,
Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands, talk about the risks and the 
societal changes involved in the introduction of the E-passport.
Electronic passports are on their way. According to EU regulations member 
states have to start issuing passports with embedded chips that store a 
digital picture of the face of the passports holder before 28 August 2006.
Digital fingerprints will be added later. These biometric measures should 
make it easier to make sure that your passport really belongs to you---and 
not to someone else.
The new chip in the passport has no external contacts: communication is wireless, but does require prior 
activation of the chip via a code that is derived from the so-called Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) at the 
bottom of the plastic page inside your passport. The introduction of these e-passports is one of the 
biggest IT-operations in the Union so far. It may seem a small change, but it isn't; it is remarkably 
complex and far reaching.
First of all, it is difficult to get the standards right. They are set by ICAO, the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, in a compromise between many parties. Authenticity and integrity of the passport data are 
guaranteed by well-established security mechanisms. But confidentiality depends on the abovementioned 
chip activation. It has not been designed to satisfy the highest levels of protection. Eavesdropping on the 
wireless communication at a border crossing is possible. The data collected in this manner is encrypted, 
but not in the very best manner. The encryption can be broken offline because the number of options 
involved (derived from the MRZ) is limited. The fingerprints that are introduced in a next stage (in a 
couple of years) require an additional protection mechanism, developed by the EU itself. It is 
complicated, and involves a non-trivial exchange of certificates between states. Assuming such standards 
are implemented uniformly, suitable e-passport readers have to be introduced at border stations. And 
the resulting new checks have to be integrated into new procedures - for instance, on how to act when 
the biometry does not match, or when the chip fails. The introduction of the e-passport may also lead to 
be major societal change.
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Professor Bart Jacobs (left) and Professor Jaap-Henk Hoepman (right)
We expect that the actual use in international travel of the additional options offered by the new e- 
passport will grow only slowly. It is by no means clear if biometrics works at such a wide scale. But what 
we can already see is that the pressure is building up to employ the new options also in other areas than 
border inspection. For instance, your bank may also wish to use the biometric options offered by the new 
passport---in order to decrease identity fraud. Given the current set-up, it can access the digital facial 
image in your passport if you hand over the document. Accessing the (future) fingerprints will require 
additional certificates from governments. Will they give it to banks? Or to institutes in health care or 
social services? Or to casinos? Pilots to test the use of biometrics to combat social security fraud are 
already happening in the Netherlands.
The issue at stake is what is often called "function 
creep". The e-passport is designed for one purpose, 
but may very well end up being used for many other 
purposes. Is there any control? It is not clear. Certain 
countries, like the Netherlands, intend to create a 
central repository of all data, including biometrics, on the passports they issue to their citizens. The 
official goals of this database are to increase (1) the security of the passport, and (2) the effectiveness of 
national identification laws. It allows for more thorough checks when applying for a new passport, or for 
additional on-line verification of passports. It also allows for other, possibly non-intended, uses. For one 
thing it makes on-line identification possible.
Citizens can be identified and traced even if they do not carry their passport. It could also be used to 
solve more crimes. Fingerprints found at a crime scene could be matched against the nation-wide 
fingerprint database. As far as we know, no concrete plans for applications like the latter exist. But they 
may become very hard to resist, once the enabling infrastructure is in place. Widespread use of 
biometrics will change the balance of power between states and their citizens. The current European 
standards for the protection of the fingerprints for instance solely focus on the use of these fingerprints 
for border inspection.
No provisions for the use of the passport in other situations are included. The security implications when 
the new passports will actually be used for other applications are unclear. Biometrics raises high hopes. 
But the technique is highly overrated. Two basic laws for ordinary password use are: change regularly, 
and avoid multiple use of the same password. Both laws are broken with the use of biometrics: you use 
the same "password", say a scan of your finger or iris, everywhere, and you can never change it - after it 
is compromised. Biometrics may actually lead to an increase of identity fraud via what we like to call 
"bio-phishing": fraudulently taking your biometrics in order to be admitted as you somewhere else.
The new passport should provide stronger proof of ones identity. Precisely this additional strength forms 
the basis for future applications. As a consequence, the value of the biometric data on the passport 
(related to the value of the assets they give access to) also increases. At the same time exposure of this
Widespread use of biometrics will change the 
balance of power between states and their 
citizens.
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data is required on many more occasions. More applications imply more potential vulnerabilities. If the 
value of the biometrics increases and their exposure becomes more likely, then the risk of using these 
biometrics also increases. It is therefore very well possible that we arrive at a situation where the risk of 
using the new passport for identification becomes higher then current identification techniques. The 
paradox then is that with the widespread adoption of an apparently more secure passport, we actually 
may render ourselves less secure! What is needed is "the big picture": a perspective on identity 
management in modern societies, looking 10-15 years ahead. It is important to give citizens control over 
authentication, i.e. over what part of their identity they wish to disclose in which situation.
We can envisage a situation where everyone of us is constantly carrying a smart identity token, for 
instance in the form of a mobile phone, identity card, or implanted chip. A very basic rule is that in every 
situation, the environment should authenticate itself first. The token can then respond, based on a pre­
defined or an ad hoc policy, determined by the user. For instance, only when it is clear that I am at home 
it may give away all my personal preferences. The environment may then require additional proofs---for 
instance via biometrics---before certain services are offered. The proof method should be proportional to 
the service level. Certain electronic identity checks may be enforced by law. Such future scenarios 
require a thorough rethinking of personal identities.
It will have to take privacy into account, not only in a one-sided manner as impediment to public 
security, but also as an essential element of personal security. For instance, if you, say as a politician, 
always broadcast your identity, you are vulnerable to e-bombs that only detonate in your presence. 
Personal identity management is fundamental in an increasingly connected world. The explicit use of 
personal policies makes life (again) a bit more complicated. But if we observe closely how high-school 
children manage and protect their contacts through mobiles, email, chat and instant messaging 
programs, we can already notice that the youngest generation has a much better grasp (than us) of 
virtual identities.
Professor Jaap-Henk Hoepman, www.cs.ru.nl/~jhh/ and Professor Bart Jacobs, www.cs.ru.nl/~bart/ are 
senior researchers and professors in computer security, at the Radboud University Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands. They consult the Ministry of Internal Affairs wrt. e-passports. This article reflects their 
own views.
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